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Abstract 
The field of human rights monitoring has become preoccupied with statistical methods for 
measuring performance, such as benchmarks and indicators. This is reflected within human 
rights scholarship, which has become increasingly ‘empirical’ in its approach. However, the 
relevant actors developing statistical approaches typically treat causality somewhat blithely, 
and this causes critical problems for such projects.  This article suggests that resources – 
whether temporal or fiscal - may be better allocated towards improving methods for 
identifying violations rather than developing complicated, but ultimately ineffective, 
statistical methods for monitoring human rights performance.  
Keywords: human rights, international law, philosophy of science, social science, empirical 
research 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In its 2008 report to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
1
 the UK 
informed the Committee that, amongst many other things, it had a strategy to reduce 
inequalities in health outcomes by 10%;
2
 that 58.5% of 15-year old school pupils achieved 5 
or more A*-C grade GCSEs or equivalent in the period 2005-2006;
3
 and that the number of 
households defined as eligible for assistance against homelessness had fallen by 43% since 
2006.
4
 This is by no means unusual. The international human rights system, broadly 
construed, is increasingly interested in aggregate outcomes - a phenomenon which sees 
human rights monitoring as an exercise of measuring performance across populations through 
statistical techniques. Notwithstanding the recent development of an individual complaints 
procedure for the ICESCR, the international human rights system and its academic study now 
concerns itself in large part with how to monitor human rights performance across groups, 
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populations, and societies. Whether a given individual’s rights have been violated in a given 
circumstance is, in the context of the UN treaty system, a question that is becoming almost 
quaint; the focus is increasingly on how far in general human rights are being protected in a 
given State, as evidenced by measured outcomes. 
 Critics of this phenomenon have raised concerns about the way in which human rights 
statistics are gathered and used,
5
 about how statistical indicators can act to obscure truth or to 
mask political choices,
6
 or even how the use of statistics in international governance ushers in 
a new era of audit and control.
7
 The author shares these concerns, and adds a more 
foundational epistemic one: at the heart of this development towards outcomes measurement 
there is a conceptual blind spot. That conceptual blind spot is causality. What causes 
statistically measured human rights outcomes?  
Identifying and attributing causality - the making of “credible causal inferences”8 - in 
human societies is fraught with difficulty. This has been known and understood since David 
Hume was writing, and is nowadays often tritely summarised with the maxim “correlation is 
not causation”. This means that, for instance, establishing whether the UK government 
actually caused the reported fall in the number of households defined as eligible for 
assistance against homelessness of 43% between 2006 and 2009 is not straightforward. The 
fall may have been correlated with all manner of changes both in government policy and in 
the economic and social sphere, but identifying the spurious correlations and separating them 
from genuine causes is difficult - if not, indeed, impossible. By extension, therefore, the 
statistic does not actually demonstrate anything, on its own, about human rights performance, 
because unless the underlying causality is understood, or adequately and persuasively 
theorised, the quantitatively-measured human rights outcome of “number of households 
defined as eligible for assistance against homelessness” cannot be attributed to specific 
actions of the British State. While, of course, statistical outcomes (if accurately measured and 
appropriately selected) may reflect the lived experiences of the right-holders in some sense, 
that does not necessarily permit assessment of compliance with treaty obligations. 
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 This problem is elided to some degree by the notion of the obligations to respect, 
protect and fulfil,
9
 but, as we shall see, that elision is not particularly satisfactory if genuine 
improvement of human rights protection is sought. Moreover, doctrinally, while there are 
good reasons for arguing that the rules regarding state responsibility have certain unique 
characteristics in the field of human rights, the treaty texts are typically phrased in such a way 
that requires close assessment of the effectiveness of measures taken - which by definition 
requires a clear understanding of cause and effect. This is true in general, given that most of 
the major human rights treaties frame the obligations in terms of “appropriate measures” or 
similar, but is especially true in the field of economic and social rights, which hinge on 
whether resources are being allocated appropriately. The system, in other words, is predicated 
on the assessment of effectiveness, but assessments of effectiveness can only be made if the 
underlying causality is known or can be persuasively argued. 
 Social scientists in various fields have in recent years increasingly begun to grapple 
with Hume’s ‘problem of causality’, even as a revolution in ‘Big Data’ looms on the 
horizon.
10
 It is nowadays widely recognised and understood that the problem of causality - 
the difficulty of making credible causal inferences - cannot simply be ignored or dismissed as 
nit-picking. In particular, the move towards experimental and quasi-experimental techniques 
which is well underway, whether in the fields of psychology,
11
 public policy,
12
 political 
science,
13
 or law,
14
 must be interpreted as a widespread rejection of the possibility that 
statistical measurement or econometric analysis alone can be a guide for making policy or a 
method for assessing its effectiveness on its own. Yet even while these approaches may hold 
some promise in certain fields, for human rights assessment, the complexity of the system 
and its actors, financial and other pragmatic concerns, and the fact that quasi-experimental 
techniques do not unlock the “black box of causality”15 mean that they are unlikely to bear 
any fruit for the foreseeable future.  
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 This means that the assessment of human rights performance must remain a matter for 
theory, politics, and, above all, narrative. The promise of statistics to provide an objective 
basis for assessing compliance (despite the fact that there are some uses for statistics in 
human rights monitoring) is a mirage. Yet this does not mean that monitoring human rights 
performance must be an abstract, discursive, and superficial affair. In fact, if anything, it calls 
for a renewed focus on the individual, because it is at the level of the individual and 
individuals that assessments about causality can be credibly and sensibly made. That is, the 
UN human rights system could much more profitably focus its attention on what can be 
known - whether an individual’s human rights were violated - rather than on abstract, 
aggregated quantitative measurement where causality cannot be plausibly attributed. 
 
II. MONITORING THROUGH OUTCOMES 
 
Contemporary human rights literature tends to take as a given that human rights are to be 
fulfilled through identifying and realising desirable outcomes (often conceptualised through 
ideals about “human dignity”16) across populations. In this approach, the individual tends to 
disappear from view, to be replaced by more general, aggregated measurement. While 
sometimes there is an acknowledgement of the necessity to “disaggregate” data by sex, 
ethnicity, and so forth, the unit of primary interest is the group (whether the population at 
large, or a “disaggregated” sub-section of it), rather than the individual. Arguably the roots of 
this phenomenon are relatively old ones, dating back to the inception of the modern UN 
human rights system and the creation of the major treaties. The ICESCR, for instance, places 
an explicit obligation on States Parties to reduce infant mortality
17
, amongst other things, and 
elsewhere a similar approach appears through implication: Article 6 of the ICESCR requires 
States Parties to achieve full employment; Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) requires States Parties to take measures to combat malnutrition; and Article 10 
of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) requires States Parties to encourage coeducation. Other examples are scattered 
through all of the major treaties. These obligations by their nature suggest a system of 
monitoring which is primarily interested in the aggregate: what is the infant mortality rate? 
What is the unemployment rate? What proportion of children is malnourished? And so forth. 
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 Yet the view that compliance is something that can be measured through assessing the 
level of achievement of outcomes has become increasingly fixed institutionally. Relatively 
early on, the typology of the obligations to “respect, protect and fulfil” individual rights 
became entrenched in the methodology of the treaty bodies.
18
 Only the first of these, the 
obligation to respect, has what would be thought of as a ‘negative’ character. The others, to 
protect and fulfil, respectively require States to engage proactively in ensuring that rights of 
individuals are not deprived by private actors (or to “creat[e] an environment in which rights 
are enjoyed”19); and to strengthen the capacity for individuals to enjoy their rights.20 Despite 
the fact that rights inhere in individuals, the obligations to protect and fulfil naturally steer the 
focus of the treaty bodies and States towards the aggregate – towards the way in which the 
State attempts to create the appropriate environment or strengthen the capacity for individuals 
to enjoy rights. It hardly requires pointing out that those obligations naturally also imply that 
measurement is required; how well a given State Party is progressing is a question which is to 
be at least partially answered through primarily quantitative analysis.  
It follows that the aim of States Parties should be to improve human rights outcomes, 
and that the focus should be on State obligations and to what extent they are being fulfilled: 
this is sometimes called a “duty-bearer perspective”.21 The crux of this perspective is that the 
concern ought not simply to be with enjoyment of rights on the part of the right-holders - that 
is, ordinary citizens. Its emphasis is rather the efforts which the State puts into achieving 
those outcomes.
22
 In other words, the primary focus is on the measures which the State takes 
to improve outcomes, rather than individual violations – the interest is not so much in 
whether given individuals are having their rights violated, but rather whether the State is 
succeeding in creating an environment in which rights are enjoyed, and in strengthening the 
capacity for individuals to enjoy their rights.  
 Finally, at a practical level, the UN human rights system is not constituted - either 
legally or technically - to be primarily concerned with monitoring compliance with treaty 
provisions at the individual level. This is a somewhat perverse observation given that, 
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doctrinally at least, the view remains that human rights inhere in the individual rather than the 
group. Yet the treaty bodies are tend to hew towards an aggregate or general perspective 
because of their role and composition. As a matter of law, violations of given individuals’ 
rights are only currently for the most part relevant in the optional individual communication 
procedures, because of the manner in which the treaties were created, and as a technical 
matter the treaty bodies do not in their present form have the capacity or resources to focus 
their attention on the detail of individual cases.
23
 It is natural, then, that in the international 
human rights system the notion of human rights as Dworkinian protections owned by 
individuals so as to trump the State should be superseded by a conceptualisation of rights as 
mechanisms for guiding policy: as tools by which to achieve improvement towards agreed 
outcomes. The protection of the right to health becomes a measurable phenomenon using 
outcomes such as immunisation rates;
24
 the right to freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment becomes partly a matter of assessing improvement in the outcome, 
“proportion of women reporting forms of violence against themselves or their children”25 and 
so forth. The nature of human rights monitoring changes accordingly. 
This in turn has naturally led to an increased interest in measurement - particularly 
quantitative measurement - of human rights outcomes within the field in general. It manifests 
itself in the routine work of the UN treaty bodies, as, for instance, when we find the CESCR 
in its Concluding Observations on the UK’s most recent periodic report urging the UK to 
work towards reducing the wage gap between men and women in the private sector, to 
provide information on the impact of pension reform on disadvantaged and marginalized 
groups, and to fulfil its commitment to reducing health inequalities by 10 per cent by 2010.
26
 
It manifests itself in State reports themselves, as, for example, in the same report, which 
contains an entire page of extensive statistics regarding maternity and paternity work 
arrangements (“the average period of maternity pay leave is now six months, up from four 
months in 2002…the proportion of dads [sic] taking more than two weeks rose from 22% to 
36% in just three years…77% of new mothers think that fathers are confident of caring for a 
child”27). It is a dominant theme in the supporting work of the Office of the High 
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Commissioner for Human Rights, which has been developing, over the preceding decade, a 
structure and methodology for monitoring human rights performance based on the use of 
largely quantitative human rights indicators
28
 that has been adopted by a number of domestic 
human rights institutions.
29
 This breaks rights down into handfuls of attributes which are then 
further subdivided into structure, process and outcome indicators purporting to evidence 
commitment, effort and results respectively, all predicated on the previous UN Deputy High 
Commissioner for Human Rights’ motto that “If you don’t count it, it won’t count”.30 And it 
is increasingly a preoccupation in the scholarship of human rights-focused academics, with 
outcomes-measurement now a burgeoning field, characterised by an attempt to apply greater 
rigour and conceptual clarity to the notions of the duty-bearer perspective and progressive 
realisation. Prominent examples include the Cingranelli and Richards’ eponymous Human 
Rights Data Project (the CIRI)
31
, and the Index of Social and Economic Rights Fulfilment 
(SERF Index) project at NYU, which aims to develop not only a measurement tool for 
economic and social rights fulfilment but also a method for ranking States on the basis of the 
extent to which they are complying with their obligations under the ICESCR.
32
 A further 
instance is the blossoming field of human rights budget analysis, which has become 
fashionable not only in the academic sphere,
33
 but also in the UN human rights system,
34
 and 
even amongst some domestic human rights institutions.
35
  
This is undoubtedly part of a broader social-scientific movement towards greater use 
of “empirical” methods36 which has developed in legal scholarship over the past two decades, 
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in Law” 65 Stanford Law Review (2013) 1195.  
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and must in turn surely be located as part of a wider phenomenon in the humanities and social 
sciences overall.
37
 As elsewhere, a field which was once defined almost exclusively by either 
doctrinal argument or normative prescription has been transformed into one preoccupied with 
measurement. Improvement in human rights performance comes in the form of ‘better’ 
statistical outcomes which demonstrate that a right (envisioned as a kind of facet in the 
protection of human dignity, however that is defined) is being fulfilled in the aggregate. A 
higher proportion of seats in a parliament being held by women and members of ‘target 
groups’ indicates the right to participate in public affairs is being fulfilled;38 a higher 
proportion of the population using an improved drinking water source indicates improvement 
regarding the right to adequate housing;
39
 an increase in the proportion of adults with a BMI 
of less than 18.5 indicates failure to protect the right to adequate food;
40
 an increase in the 
waiting list for social housing correlated with lower investment indicates that the State is 
failing to use its maximum available resources to protect the right to housing,
41
 and so forth. 
Human rights monitoring – whether undertaken by the treaty bodies or by academics or 
practitioners – is becoming increasingly sophisticated, moving away from its fairly 
rudimentary roots towards a technical exercise incorporating econometric and statistical 
methods which purport to revolutionise the manner in which compliance with human rights 
treaty obligations is assessed.
42
 Human rights in turn almost become conceptualised as 
drivers of public policy: articulations of social justice goals, progress towards which can be 
quantitatively measured. 
 
III. CAUSALITY AND THE ‘OUTCOMES APPROACH’ 
 
There has been a level of criticism of this approach. Meckled-Garcia, for instance, sees in the 
outcomes-view a consequentialist tendency which disrupts the very notion of human rights as 
rights,
43
 whereas Koskenniemi questions a growing managerialist tendency amongst 
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contemporary human rights advocacy, seen most clearly in the move towards human rights 
‘mainstreaming’, which seems by extension to have much to say with respect to much of the 
forgoing.
44
 This article acknowledges those critiques, but raises an additional epistemic 
concern: the question of what causes a given human rights outcome is not a trivial one. 
In the first place, though, it is necessary to establish why causation matters for an 
outcomes or duty-bearer approach to human rights monitoring - for typically it is treated 
somewhat blithely in the field of human rights, where it is generally taken as a given that 
measured outcomes are attributable to the State. There is a certain doctrinal basis for this. To 
most human rights scholars, state responsibility engages when a State is in breach of an 
international obligation, whether through act or omission, and since the core human rights 
treaties all to some degree or other require State Parties to ensure, protect, secure, or promote 
the rights they contain,
45
 then it follows that if those rights are not being ensured, secured, 
etc., then a violation or violations has taken place for which the State has responsibility.
46
 In 
contemporary human rights law, in other words, the distinction between public and private 
actors which the Articles on State Responsibility (2001) enshrine effectively disappears. It 
does not matter that, for instance, a slum clearance leaving people homeless may have been 
carried out by a private landlord. The State failed to create an environment in which the right 
to housing was protected, respected and fulfilled - through omission in failing to provide 
alternative social housing or appropriate legislative protections - and hence it was in violation 
of its obligations vis-à-vis that right.
47
 State responsibility engages almost irrespective of the 
actor. The tripartite obligations to respect, protect and fulfil reinforce this in suggesting that a 
State is in violation of its obligations simply by dint of failing to create an environment in 
which the rights of those in its jurisdiction are protected. It follows that causation can be 
elided, and it can be readily established that a violation or violations have taken place on the 
basis of a statistical observation alone. There is objective-seeming evidence that the State is 
not creating an environment in which rights are enjoyed (or exercising “due diligence” in 
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preventing private acts which impact on that enjoyment
48
), whether through act or omission, 
and hence there is a violation. It follows that States’ obligations come to be conceptualised as 
requirements to improve across statistical measures: the number of households eligible for 
assistance against homelessness has declined by 43%, ergo the UK is performing well in 
terms of protecting, respecting and fulfilling the right to housing under Article 11 of the 
ICESCR.  
This elision of, or blitheness about, causation results in both conceptual and practical 
problems. First, simply from a common sense perspective, it is unsatisfactory that any given 
measure of human rights performance should be disconnected from causal explanations. 
While, for instance, a fall of 43% in the number of households eligible for assistance against 
homelessness is to be welcomed, it is surely necessary to understand why that fall took place 
if either the government concerned or the treaty body monitoring system has any interest at 
all in causing the number to drop yet further. Second, it clearly runs contrary to widely shared 
notions of fairness and justice to attribute liability, or assign praise, where it is not due. In the 
long-term, it cannot be to the advantage of the UN human rights system in general to 
undermine its own legitimacy by relying on statistical measurement of ‘outcomes’ whose 
underlying causality may be justifiably disputed. And third, it ought to be self-evident that 
those engaged in the monitoring of human rights should be interested in truth for its own 
sake. 
Yet there are also compelling legal considerations. In the first place, despite there 
being doctrinal arguments for holding States responsible in general for the extent to which 
human rights are protected in their jurisdictions, this should not be permitted to vitiate the 
requirement to establish causal links between State act or omission and the measurement in 
question. To take a paradigmatic example, the CEDAW plainly assigns responsibility to State 
Parties in preventing discrimination against women: it requires them to take all appropriate 
measures to modify or abolish not just discriminatory legislation but also customs and 
practices constituting discrimination, and also to take appropriate measures to modify “social 
and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women” with a view to eliminating prejudices 
and so forth.
49
 The public/private divide is clearly not applicable or relevant with respect to 
these provisions, and it is tempting to ignore the issue of causation in light of this: if 
discriminatory practices or attitudes are evidenced statistically, then by definition the State is 
                                                          
48
 Most famously the Inter-American Courts of Human Rights developed this approach in the Velasquez-
Rodriguez Case (Honduras) 4 IACtHR (ser. C) (1988), although the European Court of Human Rights has used 
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in violation of such requirements. But this leaves unanswered the critical questions of how 
discriminatory customs and practices, or social and cultural patterns of conduct, can in fact be 
modified. What causes a discriminatory practice to develop in the first place? What causes it 
to continue? And what might cause it to disappear? Our interest in such questions comes not 
only from a concern with what might constitute best practices or what might be the best 
policy to implement; it also stems from the nature of States Parties’ obligations under the 
various treaties. 
This is because, while in the ICCPR it is largely implicit,
50
 all of the major human 
rights treaties frame State Party obligations around “appropriate measures” or similar, in such 
a way that effectiveness of measures taken must be assessed in order to establish compliance. 
This is most obvious in the case of the ICESCR, which requires States Parties to takes steps 
towards progressively realising the rights contained in the Covenant by all appropriate means. 
Clearly, the question of whether the steps a State is taking do in fact help progressively 
realise the relevant rights can only be answered through understanding and assessing the 
effect of those steps on rights protections. Similarly, the measurement of effectiveness is 
immanent in the question of what is or is not “appropriate”. This requirement is only made 
more acute by the requirement that States Parties use their “maximum available resources” to 
realise Covenant rights. The CRC Committee, whose Covenant contains a similar obligation, 
has essentially expressed the view that this sort of requirement can be monitored simply by 
identifying which portions of a State’s budget are allocated towards fulfilling rights.51 Yet, as 
is often explicitly or implicitly acknowledged, this is only half the story: the requirement is 
that States take steps towards progressively realising rights and also spend the maximum 
available resources on doing so - not merely that they expend the maximum available 
resources on rights goals.
52
 There must be some demonstration that the resources in question 
are actually being expended in such a way as to progressively realise rights protections. Thus 
Magdalena Sepúlveda, the former Special Rapporteur on the Question of Human Rights and 
Extreme Poverty, considers the obligation to mean that expenditures must be shown to be 
efficient and effective; that corruption must be curbed; that funds assigned to ESC rights 
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 Only Article 23 (4) of the ICCPR mentions “appropriate steps” (in relation to equality in marriage), but 
assessing appropriateness/effectiveness of measures seems implicit in the due diligence obligations generally 
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purposes must be fully expended for that purpose, and so forth.
53
 The CESCR Committee, 
meanwhile, interprets the obligation as permitting it to take into account whether a State is 
adopting a measure which “least restricts Covenant rights” out of those available when 
assigning resources - and will only view retrogressive steps as permissible if they have been 
introduced after consideration of all alternatives.
54
 Clearly none of this can be achieved 
without a mechanism for evaluating the impact of resource expenditure on actual rights 
protections: in other words, the extent to which a given expenditure causes a given outcome.  
Similar reasoning applies in most other treaty contexts. The CERD, for instance, in 
Article 2 requires States Parties to undertaking “appropriate means” to eliminate racial 
discrimination, including by “taking effective measures” to amend or rescind regulations 
which create or perpetuate racial discrimination or encouraging the elimination of barriers 
between races. Again, immanent in those requirements are questions such as: what are the 
appropriate means to eliminate racial discrimination? Which regulations create or perpetuate 
racial discrimination, and what would be effective measures to amend them? How can 
barriers between races be eliminated? Establishing cause and effect is clearly crucial in 
answering those questions. Likewise under the CEDAW there are requirements to take all 
“appropriate measures” to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, 
organization or enterprise; to “modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and 
women”; and to ensure that there are equal rights between men and women in education - 
amongst many other things.
55
 Since these requirements are substantive as well as de jure in 
character
56
 there is inescapably a need to assess the effectiveness or appropriateness of 
measures taken, which can only be achieved through understanding cause and effect: what, 
for instance, is the State doing to ensure that there is de facto equality in education, and is it 
having an impact? This will be a consideration for the vast majority of obligations throughout 
the core human rights treaties. 
A fascinating illustration of the need for understanding cause and effect in 
establishing whether “appropriate measures” have been taken is given in the CEDAW 
Committee’s inquiry, based on Article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW 
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Convention, into the abduction, rape and murder of women in Northern Mexico.
57
 Here, 
many different measures for preventing gender-based violence in the area of Ciudad Juárez 
are described and discussed; one example is the introduction of 700 members of the 
“preventive federal police” in the city to improve security and provide community support 
activities to enhance social integration. But in the words of the Committee: 
 
There is no consensus between the authorities and non-governmental organizations in 
their assessment of the federal presence in Ciudad Juárez. The authorities stress that 
progress has been made in improving security and reducing crime. The non-
governmental organizations stress that the presence of the preventive federal police 
does more to intimidate people than to prevent crime, and that the patrols are more 
likely to be in areas where robberies occur than in areas where women are at risk.
58
 
 
This example neatly demonstrates the difficulty of actually translating treaty 
requirements into a method for assessing whether a violation has taken place, in the absence 
of a clear understanding of the underlying mechanisms of cause and effect. As far as the 
Committee is concerned, State Parties have an obligation arising under the anti-
discrimination articles of the Convention to “take appropriate and effective measures to 
overcome all forms of gender-based violence, whether by public or private act.”59 Does the 
presence of 700 federal police members in Ciudad Juárez qualify as appropriate or effective? 
Without knowing the actual effects on gender-based violence of the presence of the federal 
police - that is, without an understanding of the causal mechanisms underlying the rate of 
gender-based violence in the city - it is impossible to draw any conclusion about its 
appropriateness or effectiveness, and hence whether Mexico’s obligations are being met. This 
can only be established if it can be plausibly demonstrated that the introduction of the federal 
police not only is reducing gender-based violence, but is also, critically, more effective than 
other possible policy measures. 
Such considerations will, in essence, be true wherever there is an attempt to measure 
human rights quantitatively, and are of critical importance in the use of indicators: if there is 
no clear causal link between government policy and an indicator, then the indicator 
                                                          
57
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demonstrates nothing about the effectiveness of the policy. This is particularly so where 
indicators are categorised into structure, process and outcome. Indeed, Donabedian himself, 
the originator of the OHCHR’s much-vaunted model for human rights indicators as it was 
first used in the field of health care, was quite clear about how crucial it was to establish 
cause and effect in structure, process and outcome rather than simply to assess them naively 
or in isolation. “There must be pre-existing knowledge of the linkage between structure and 
process, and between process and outcome, before quality assessment can be undertaken.”60 
That is, “[t]he three-part approach to quality assessment is possible only because good 
structure increases the likelihood of good process, and good process increases the likelihood 
of a good outcome. It is necessary, therefore, to have established such a relationship before 
any particular component of structure, process or outcome can be used to assess quality. 
[Emphasis added]”61 In other words, for the structure-process-outcome model to demonstrate 
anything at all about performance, there must be an understanding of how structural 
indicators - commitments - bring about better policy (“process”), and how this in turn fosters 
better results, or “outcomes”.  
This cannot be demonstrated without understanding the underlying causality. Taking 
an example from the OHCHR’s Guide to illustrate, under the right to food an outcome 
indicator for the ‘Nutrition’ attribute is “prevalence of underweight and stunted children 
under five years of age”.62 This is directly linked to four process indicators: the proportion of 
the targeted population brought above the minimum level of dietary energy consumption in 
the reporting period, the proportion of the population covered under public nutrition 
supplement programmes, the coverage of public programmes on nutrition education and 
awareness, and the proportion of the population with access to an improved drinking water 
source. It is also linked to two process indicators which are shared by all outcome indicators 
under the right to food: the proportion of received complaints on the right to food which are 
investigated by the relevant authorities, and the net official development assistance for food 
security as a proportion of public expenditure on food security.
63
 Setting aside concerns about 
data collection, the primary concern here must be to what extent the process indicators 
offered (for instance, the coverage of public programmes on nutrition education and 
awareness) actually result in - or cause - the outcome, “prevalence of underweight and 
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stunted children under five years of age”. Without an accurate understanding of this, the 
process indicator demonstrates effectively nothing (either positive or negative) about 
performance: it has no usefulness as an assessment tool for actually monitoring the extent to 
which the State is living up to its obligations as a duty-bearer. It may be that 100% of the 
population is covered by a public programme on nutrition education and awareness, but 
unless the effect of that programme on the prevalence of underweight and stunted children 
under five years of age is actually known, the figure of 100% is simply a statistical 
observation. It may have a high or low impact on child nutrition, or none at all. (Or the 
impact could indeed even be negative if the educational content of the programme is 
erroneous.) 
The requirement for understanding underlying causality is perhaps at its strongest 
with respect to human rights budget analysis. Here, again, in the abstract there appears to be a 
strong case for monitoring via resource allocation, which in practice requires a strong 
understanding of cause and effect. Kempf, for instance, suggests an “information pyramid” 
approach which divides rights into three tiers - key measures, expanded indicators, and 
context.
64
 The middle of these typically involves measuring government expenditure so as to 
give a “more in-depth understanding of the forces at work behind the key indicator.”65 This 
would result, for example, in the right to education being measured through the literacy rate 
(Tier 1); government expenditure on education, transport and lunch programmes (Tier 2); and 
case studies (Tier 3).
66
 Here, clearly, there is a requirement to understand how government 
expenditure results in the literacy rate being what it is, and how increases or decreases in 
government expenditure affect it; the relationship between expenditure on education and 
literacy must be known in order to provide a proper and accurate assessment of performance. 
If, for instance, expenditure is wasted on ineffective teaching (which is a perennial problem 
in the developing world
67
), then it is unlikely on its face to contribute to improving the 
literacy rate. On the other hand, improvements in the literacy rate may be unrelated to 
government expenditure where, for instance, private schools and tutors are widely used.
68
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 This kind of consideration will always be necessary when attempting to analyse 
budgets from a human rights perspective in detail; it is the matter of only brief moments of 
thought to generate examples of why credible causal inferences are required if monitoring is 
to be performed through statistical outcomes. How does government expenditure on a given 
programme affect the unemployment rate? How would the unemployment rate have changed 
if expenditure had been different? How does expenditure on a given aspect of health care 
improve waiting times for routine operations? What if the money had been spent in a 
different way? If a local education authority approves the building of a new school where the 
old one was growing decrepit, is this a more suitable expenditure than using the money to 
employ more teachers? Which option has the most impact on literacy rates? These sorts of 
questions are inherent in any exercise which seeks to establish whether the best alternative 
has been chosen, or expenditures are efficient and effective. Yet they cannot be assessed 
without understanding how the respective human rights outcomes are caused. This is doubly 
the case where analysts seek to ‘disaggregate’ expenditure for the purposes of, for instance, 
“gender-responsive budgeting” or similar69 - which means examining, for instance, what was 
a given budgetary item’s impact on gender inequality or people with disabilities.70 For such 
measures, a sophisticated understanding not only of the impact of funding in general but also 
of its impact on the disaggregated group is also required - effectively doubling the analytical 
workload. 
Finally, it bears emphasising that if States have obligations to protect, respect and 
fulfil rights to the extent that the treaty bodies have generally argued, and especially where 
the text of a treaty provision suggests that there is no distinction to be made between public 
and private actors in terms of state responsibility, then much of the above discussion also 
holds true with respect to causality and the role of Non-State Actors. What roles private 
actors play in causing measured outcomes - and to what extent the actions of private actors 
are in turn 'caused' or contributed to by the State - are, of course, questions giving rise to a 
similar set of considerations, and this creates yet an another layer of complexity and further 
requirements to demonstrate and understand cause and effect. 
It is not just from practical and conceptual perspectives, then, that a failure to properly 
address matters of causation is problematic: it poses critical problems for the legal questions 
of whether a State is enacting appropriate or effective measures to achieve human rights 
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protections. And as we shall now see, the apparent blitheness about causation serves to mask 
a host of difficulties associated with an outcomes-approach to human rights monitoring. 
 
IV. THE PROBLEM OF CAUSALITY AND CREDIBLE CAUSAL INFERENCE 
 
In recent decades, there has been a strong movement in econometrics, policy studies, and 
related fields, away from what might be called a naïve regression-based view of causation. 
This naïve view was perhaps most prominently and succinctly expressed by Leamer in his 
famous article “Let’s Take the ‘Con’ Out of ‘Econometrics’”.71 Leamer used an illustrative 
analogy of a comparison between an agricultural experimenter and an econometrician. The 
agricultural experimenter divides a farm into smaller plots of land and randomly selects 
which he will fertilize; if some plots are fertilized but some not, the difference in mean yield 
between the fertilized and the non-fertilized plots will be a measure of the effect of fertilizer 
on agricultural yields. This is the way econometricians like to think of themselves, according 
to Leamer, but in fact this is “grossly misleading”. Rather: 
 
The applied econometrician is like a farmer who notices that the yield is somewhat 
higher under trees where birds roost, and he uses this as evidence that bird droppings 
increase yields. However, when he presents this finding at the annual meeting of the 
American Ecological Association, another farmer in the audience objects that he used 
the same data but came up with the conclusion that moderate amounts of shade 
increase yields. A bright chap in the back of the room then observes that these two 
hypotheses are indistinguishable, given the available data. He mentions the phrase 
‘identification problem’, which, though no one knows quite what he means, is said 
with such authority that it is totally convincing…72 
 
The econometricians, in other words, do not understand that it is generally impossible to 
know or demonstrate convincingly what causes a statistical pattern through analysis of data 
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that is not the product of a controlled experiment. The agricultural experimenter uses the 
nearest thing possible to a laboratory experiment, and his inferences about the effect of 
fertilization on crop yields are convincing. The econometrician attempts to infer causation 
from noticing a statistical pattern, but other econometricians infer different causal 
mechanisms and there is no way to distinguish between their competing causal claims. A 
similar process takes place in the monitoring of human rights by statistics: a fall in the 
number of households requiring assistance against homelessness is observed. Different 
observers may, however, infer different causal mechanisms, and there is no objective method 
to prefer one to another.  
 This is, of course, essentially a re-statement of what David Hume had demonstrated 
philosophically in the mid-18
th
 Century, which is that we can never “by our utmost scrutiny 
discover any thing but one event following another”.73 That is, causality can never be proven, 
because there may always be hidden or unmeasurable conditionals affecting a given outcome. 
The laboratory experiment, which allows the measurement of known variables through 
holding others constant, is a suitable and practical method of diminishing the problem, but 
beyond the laboratory making causal inferences is fraught with problems.
74
  
Without straying too far into technical detail, regression analysis is often used as a 
tool for solving the problems social scientists encounter when attempting to isolate the effect 
of a variable. In layman’s terms, a regression analysis is a method of investigating 
relationships between variables, but typically it means seeking to ascertain causal effects, 
such as the effect of price on demand.
75
 An example might be a model which attempts to 
measure the relationship between unemployment and the suicide rate; typically this would 
take the form of a “multiple regression” which aimed to control for other independent 
variables than unemployment (e.g. sex, age, etc.) in an attempt to determine how 
unemployment impacts on the suicide rate in isolation from other factors. It is, in other 
words, an attempt by a statistician to move away from the position of the farmer who 
observes the correlation between roosting birds and high crop yields, and towards the position 
of the agricultural experimenter who manipulates one variable - fertilization - while holding 
the others constant.  
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At root, the use of multiple regression analysis as a tool for inferring causation is 
predicated on measuring the effect of one variable while controlling for other variables - 
purely through statistical manipulation. The endeavour is always confounded, then, by the 
problem that not all other variables are necessarily known: indeed, it is not logically possible 
to be sure that all variables have been identified. This results in two insurmountable barriers 
to making credible causal inferences through statistical analysis alone. 
The first of these is the problem of omitted variable bias: since controlling for all 
other relevant variables cannot be done - or at least, the statistician can never be sure that all 
other relevant variables have been controlled for - the results of the regression analysis could 
always potentially have been biased by the fact that there is a hidden conditional affecting the 
outcome. An illustrative example given by King and Keohane is a hypothetical study of sub-
Saharan African states which finds that coups d’etat appear more frequently where regimes 
are repressive. It is plausible, however, that high unemployment may be associated with an 
increased probability of both coups d’etat and political repression.76 Such a study would 
therefore need to control for unemployment, but it would not be possible to do this if accurate 
unemployment figures were unavailable. Even if those figures were available and the 
unemployment variable controlled for, however, the researchers may have overlooked the 
effect of another variable that might plausibly have an effect on the frequency of coups 
d’etat: the independence of the military. They may find some way to control for that variable 
also, but then overlook the level of salary that soldiers could expect; dissatisfaction amongst 
soldiers may also have an effect on the likelihood of a coup d’etat occurring. And so forth. 
The list of omitted potential variables may go on ad infinitum. And second, since the list of 
omitted potential variables may go on indefinitely, the results of a naïve regression-based 
analysis can always be disputed - as Leamer so aptly demonstrated: another scholar can 
always examine the same set of data and come up with a competing interpretation, with no 
means of deciding whose interpretation is preferable. This is largely the reason why so many 
perennial and widespread social debates have never been resolved, despite huge arsenals of 
statistical “evidence” arrayed on either side: Pfaff gives the American-centric examples of 
whether the death penalty deters crime or whether gun ownership increases violence;
77
 other 
examples might be whether abortion has any effect on the crime rate,
78
 whether the minimum 
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wage affects employment,
79
 or whether microfinance actually helps the very poor.
80
 Both 
“sides” in such debates find it straightforward to identify omitted variables in each other’s 
data, and to identify their own correlations which confirm their existing biases, so neither is 
ever in a position to cede defeat.
81
  
As well as the issue of variables being unknown is the question of how variables 
interact. JS Mill referred to this problem as the “intermixture of effects”,82 although it is more 
commonly referred to in the modern day as the problem of endogeneity. Put briefly, what 
Mill observed was that, when confronted with complexity, there is a tendency to attempt to 
single out “from the multitude of antecedent circumstances” one condition as a potential 
cause, and then to measure it.
83
 In fact, however, ‘causes’ may interfere with one another; 
they are not discrete, but intermingled. Manzi uses the example of attempting to assess the 
impact of brand difference on sales in shops, holding all other factors equal. A possible 
variable likely to affect sales is the presence of an ATM in a shop, and this therefore needs to 
be held constant if we are interested in measuring the impact of brand different alone. But 
this may have different effects in different contexts: in a large shop, having an ATM may 
drive sales because it draws in customers, but in a small shop, having an ATM may reduce 
sales because it increases crowding near the cash register that discourages customers. Yet 
“holding the presence of an ATM constant” in a typical regression equation only allows 
either a positive or negative coefficient for that variable - either an ATM is present in a shop 
or not. This does not capture the way the variable changes according to context. This problem 
is remedied by adding further interaction terms: replacing “ATM in shop” with other 
variables such as “ATM in shop AND shop is large” and “ATM in shop AND shop is small”, 
and so forth. But interactions-with-interactions can quickly become myriad: an ATM may 
increase net sales in large shops, but not when at a highway rest stop (motorway services, in 
British parlance) - so there would need to be further interaction terms: “ATM in shop AND 
shop is large AND shop is in highway rest stop”, and so forth. Interaction effects always tend 
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to proliferate, and to do so exponentially.
84
 For a typical example of how extreme these 
effects can become, Ho and Rubin discuss how introducing covariates for sentence length by 
month; and age, employment status, sex, prior strikes and marital status of prisoner, result in 
69 million different parameters when attempting to measure the effect of prisoner 
classification status on misconduct.
85
 The problem of endogeneity gives the lie to the notion, 
sometimes advanced in the literature, that the issue is one of counter-factuals: if only there 
was some way to know what would have happened had circumstances been different, 
causality could be observed.
86
 The truth is even more complex: since variables interact, the 
mere act of controlling one variable may bias others. 
These and similar problems
87
 have led to widespread acceptance in various disciplines 
that the “age of regression” is over.88 The kind of naïve use of regression analysis that sees 
scholars attempting to isolate and measure the effects of variables in a data set is no longer 
generally viewed as being a credible way to draw causal inferences except in limited cases. 
Instead, there has been a proliferation in past decades of what are often referred to as “quasi-
experimental techniques”: better methods for replicating, or approximating, what goes on in 
the laboratory or the agricultural experimenter’s field.89 The most widely known of these is 
the “gold standard” of the randomised field trial, which is essentially what Leamer’s 
agricultural experimenter was performing, and which is used to some effect in the fields of 
medicine and public health: here, a group of like subjects are identified and randomly 
separated into a test group and a control group, with the test group having one variable 
manipulated so as to isolate its effects. This has not changed in principle since the 
experiments of James Lind to discover the effect of citrus juice on combating scurvy. He was 
thus able to persuasively establish that citrus juice had an effect on reducing scurvy. While 
the randomised field trial is by no means perfect even in the field of medicine,
90
 through 
widespread, continuous and rigorous replication it can ultimately persuasively demonstrate 
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causality. This is because, with a large enough initial group which is then randomly assigned 
into test and control groups, and with good experimental design, it can be assumed that 
differences between individuals even out and the test and control groups are comparable in all 
other respects than the variable of interest, which is being manipulated for the test group.  
In the social sciences, however, randomised field trials tend to be difficult to perform 
- usually because costs are prohibitive (although there are increasingly innovative ways of 
carrying out such experiments
91
). Where trials cannot take place, experimenters use various 
methods to attempt to replicate something approaching a randomised field trial through 
intervening in the data. One prominent method is what is called “regression discontinuity 
analysis”, which takes advantage of a natural break or discontinuity in the data to measure 
effects around it. Perhaps the most famous and frequently cited example of this is Angrist and 
Lavy’s study of class sizes in Israeli schools.92 In the Israeli public education system there 
was a strict cap on classroom sizes at 40 students, meaning that if in a given year there was an 
enrolment of 41 or greater at a school, the students would be split into two classes - for 
instance of 20 and 21. If on the other hand there was an enrolment of 39, the students would 
remain in one class. Since it is plausible that abilities of students do not greatly vary on 
average, year on year, and it is plausible that a cohort of 41 students will have similar average 
ability to a cohort of 39, it is credible that measuring the academic achievements of classes of 
20 versus classes of 39 will demonstrate the effect of class size on academic achievement. 
And, indeed, it seemed that students in smaller class sizes tended to perform better than those 
in larger ones. Since nowadays there is simply vastly more data available than there once 
was, discovering discontinuities and taking advantage of them to measure their effects is 
becoming more easily achieved.  
This increasing use of experimental and quasi-experimental data has led some to 
claim that there is a “credibility revolution” taking place in empirical economics and related 
fields
93
 - although it is important to note that there remains a strong level of scepticism.
94
 Yet 
this same credibility revolution does not yet seem to have crept into the field of international 
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law in general or international human rights monitoring in particular, where naïve statistical 
observations and regression analysis are typically unquestioningly treated as demonstrative of 
causality (if causality is addressed at all).
95
 There is usually scant attention paid to issues such 
as the identification problem or omitted variables bias in the literature, and indeed 
correlations are very often presented as prima facie indicative of causation. This is most 
evident in the State reports, and indeed the UK’s 2009 report to the CESCR is an illustration 
par excellence of this: a mirage of meretricious statistical observations provided so as to 
create a spurious sense of compliance. Yet it is also in general true of the academic work, 
which remains rooted in the “age of regression”, left behind by developments in other fields. 
And, indeed, there are persuasive reasons for arguing that, except perhaps in the very long 
term, there are no reasons to assume that a ‘credibility revolution’ can ever in fact take place 
in the arena of human rights monitoring. Let us now turn to addressing why this should be the 
case. 
 
V. NO ‘CREDIBILITY REVOLUTION’ IN HUMAN RIGHTS MEASUREMENT? 
 
There are two core reasons, or groups of reasons, for having severe doubts about the 
applicability of quasi-experimental techniques as a method of resolving the problems 
associated with quantitative human rights measurement. These are complexities arising from 
the continuing “black box” nature of causality,96 and the connected problem of good research 
design. 
 First, it is well acknowledged that even where robust results are generated by 
experimental or quasi-experimental techniques, the causal mechanism does not simply 
emerge by default. Very often, the results lead to murky conclusions, or no conclusions at all. 
A classic example of this problem is cited by Manzi, who describes a 2009 study which 
tested the effect of free primary medical care for a sample of 1,300 test patients versus a 
randomised control group in Ghana.
97
 The results indicated that adult guardians of patients in 
the test group reported in diaries that they brought their children to more formal health care 
visits, but relied less on informal, traditional healers. Yet there was no statistically significant 
improvement in health outcomes for the test group versus the control group. How to interpret 
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these results? Why did free primary medical care apparently not cause any improvement in 
health? Manzi lists four possible theories: the marginal value of increased health care 
spending has very little effect (a common observation made in developed economies); 
traditional healing remedies are undervalued (the test group used traditional healers less, so 
the results may indicate there is no difference between Western medicine and traditional 
health care methods in the area); standards of care in Ghanaian clinics are very poor (so 
attending a clinic has no or little value); and that parents lied when filling in diaries in order 
to demonstrate they were doing something socially reliable, but were not actually taking their 
children to formal health care visits in the frequency suggested (indicating free primary care 
was not a sufficient incentive to attend). There are undoubtedly more. The results, in other 
words, provide no basis for conclusions about the impact of free primary medical care, and 
no evidence on which to formulate health care policy or assign funding, without theoretical 
explanations - but there are competing theoretical explanations which are in large part 
dependent on pre-existing biases and which are all to some degree or other plausible.
98
 Most 
tellingly, the results of the study do not even provide us with evidence about the most 
fundamental matter of all - whether spending on health care has any impact on health 
outcomes or not. If anybody wished to assess, therefore, whether Ghana had enacted 
appropriate or effective measures regarding the right to health, to the maximum of its 
available resources, the results of this study would provide no resolution whatsoever.  
 Similarly, the Angrist and Lavy study relies on an understanding of the Israeli 
education system combined with a relatively straightforward and plausible theoretical 
proposition: that in a smaller class, individual students tend to receive more attention and 
hence perform better on average. Its results alone do not suggest a causal mechanism: 
causality must be theorised. When similar studies take place in other jurisdictions, where 
conditions are different, other results may appear which need to be theorised in turn. A 
similar project to Angrist and Lavy’s took place in Chile almost a decade later; its different 
results were plausibly suggested by the authors as being due to the fact that in the Chilean 
school system wealthier parents have opportunities to send their children to schools which 
they know will have smaller class sizes - an “enrolment manipulation” phenomenon which 
contaminates the findings.
99
 But again, this observation came from familiarity with the 
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Chilean school system itself, combined with a theoretical explanation - it did not simply 
emerge magically from the data.  
 What this suggests, of course, is that there is no substitute for substantive, deep and 
expert knowledge of the subject matter at hand - especially when it comes to interpreting 
data. Contrary to the claims of, for instance, the OHCHR that quantitative measurements 
provide objective, transparent and credible methods for monitoring human rights 
performance,
100
 in actual fact it is typically the familiarity of the researcher with the subject 
matter at hand, combined with a plausible theoretical explanation of causation, which makes 
a statistically-based claim credible. In the absence of a persuasive theoretical causal 
explanation - an answer to the question, “How?” - then an observation remains at best only a 
proposition about correlation.
101
  
 It also suggests that, as is well understood in the field of public health, in order for 
experimental or quasi-experimental techniques to provide robust evidence for cause and 
effect, there must be consistent, and repeated, replication in a variety of contexts. Otherwise 
results which may appear initially convincing could be due to environmental factors whose 
effects are not observed. Angrist and Lavy’s study may allow credible, or at least plausible, 
inference of causality, in a narrow context, but a naïve conclusion drawn from it (small class 
sizes result in better academic achievement) may be limited to the social, cultural and 
temporal context in which it takes place. While the Chilean study in a sense supports the 
Angrist and Lavy study (it indicates that, intuitively at least, parents prefer their children to 
be in smaller classes - presumably because they “know” it makes for better academic 
achievement), it may not always and everywhere be true. Different educational systems have 
different characteristics and different methods of teaching.
102
 Repeating the experiment in a 
variety of different contexts makes the conclusion more robust if similar results are 
discovered elsewhere. This is doubly necessary where there simply is no agreed theoretical 
explanation for the results, as in the case of free primary medical care in Ghana. Only 
widespread, consistent, repeated experimental or quasi-experimental results which seem to 
indicate persistent correlations between a policy measure and a certain effect will prove to be 
credible. 
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 What this means is that, even if human rights scholars and the UN system were to 
move away from naïve statistical tools, they would be unlikely to receive any benefits from 
this putative “credibility revolution” except perhaps on an ad hoc basis.  It is an extremely 
complex task to identify causal mechanisms in a credible fashion in fairly narrow contexts - 
let alone across a scope as large as that of an international human rights treaty. And this in 
turn means that using the results of experimental or quasi-experimental studies as bases for 
measuring human rights performance is fiendishly difficult when considered in detail.  
To continue with the class-size example, the notion that smaller class sizes tend to 
result in better academic achievement, all else being equal, may have been plausibly 
demonstrated to be true in the Israeli education system at least. Yet this does not make, for 
instance, “average primary school class size” a suitable indicator of performance against the 
right to education: in a jurisdiction such as Chile, such an indicator would not capture the fact 
that small class sizes could primarily be composed of students from wealthier backgrounds. It 
would therefore not suggest a great deal about protection of the right to education; wealthier 
students tending to end up with a better educational experience is not, one would suggest, of 
interest regarding that particular right. It is also, naturally, contingent on teacher quality, 
which can be assumed to be relatively high in Israel, but much less so in other 
environments.
103
 If such difficulties of conceptualisation can occur with such a relatively 
straightforward-seeming measure, one can imagine the complexities surrounding the 
measurement of Ghana’s performance regarding the right to health if the apparently obvious-
seeming “availability of free primary medical care” was selected as a measure or indicator. 
Put simply, nobody knows whether making free primary medical care available in Ghana 
improves health outcomes for children - at least based on the available study.  
But perhaps above all, this fundamental complexity mitigates against accurate 
statistical human rights measurement because of the expense in time and monetary resources 
necessary to generate robust and reliable results on which to base it - especially given that 
reliable results require extensive and widespread replication. The treaty bodies have limited 
time to investigate the statistics and studies laid before them by States Parties and NGOs (and 
indeed, generally do not currently see this as their role) and human rights scholars with the 
necessary training and skills to critique the research design of others are few and far between. 
States Parties clearly do not have strong incentives to fund or conduct robust human rights-
specific research. The idea that appropriate and effective measures for the protection of 
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human rights could be guided by extensive use of experimental and quasi-experimental 
techniques is therefore simply not realistic in the short or medium term.  
 
The prospect of statistical measures and econometric tools revolutionising the practice of 
human rights monitoring, then, is a mirage. Yet it is not merely a harmless illusion, for two 
important reasons. 
 The first of these is straightforward: there is an opportunity cost, in time and other 
resources, associated with the move towards statistical analysis. Time spent running 
regressions is time lost investigating human rights violations, promoting human rights, better 
theorising or conceptualising human rights, or engaging in deep study of social phenomena. 
This may seem a trite observation, but it is one which is not sufficiently frequently made. 
 The second of these is more pernicious. As has already been alluded to, States Parties 
to human rights treaties have every incentive to make it appear as though they are in 
compliance with their treaty obligations, and the more that human rights performance 
becomes seen as quantitatively measurable, the more States will rely on statistical “evidence” 
to demonstrate improved performance. Yet, as this article has sought to demonstrate, and as 
social scientists are increasingly willing to acknowledge, statistical “evidence” in the social 
sphere is often bogus (usually being comprised of correlations without a credible causal 
explanation), and this has two particularly dangerous consequences for human rights 
monitoring. On the one hand, reliance on statistical measures allows States to game the 
system by using apparently neutral and objective-seeming veils of numbers to demonstrate 
compliance - a particular problem where, as in the UN treaty system, States Parties are 
encouraged to develop their own sets of indicators and cite their own statistics. It hardly 
needs explaining why this might result in the undesirable situation that States Parties simply 
select the measures that appear to show improvement, irrespective of cause. The intellectual 
dishonesty of the UK’s State representative to the CESCR claiming credit for a larger number 
of men taking paternity leave is a typical example of this. As well as having little to do with 
the actual performance of States Parties, such manipulation hardly contributes to a sense that 
human rights monitoring is a legitimate and robust exercise. The fact that 'good governance' 
and, by extension, evidence of good human rights performance is so frequently a stated or 
implied consideration of donors regarding the provision of aid clearly also has the potential to 
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affect the incentives of developing States engaged in that process.
104
 And on the other hand, 
the fundamentally contingent and complex nature of attempting to ascribe causality makes it 
fairly straightforward to undermine or dispute statistical measurements, on the basis of 
omitted or intermixed variables, or for other flaws in research design. This makes it simple 
for States Parties to simply explain away measurements which appear to demonstrate lack of 
compliance. In other words, naïve use of statistical measurement makes it easy for States 
Parties to muddy the waters of the reporting procedures, whether by using statistics to “buffer 
away” close monitoring, or by exploiting the contingent nature of statistical measurement of 
performance to undermine the monitoring process entirely.
105
 The “manufacturing of 
uncertainty” is hardly unknown in the field of regulation, and it would be naïve to expect that 
matters should be different in that of human rights monitoring.
106
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION: REFOCUSING ON THE INDIVIDUAL?  
 
What are the lessons, then, for human rights monitoring? First, there must be a stronger 
emphasis placed on good field work, and on the expert field worker. If developments in the 
social sciences in recent decades have taught us anything, it is that even the most robust, 
well-designed and widely-replicated studies do not generate meaningful results without an 
appropriate interpretation from an expert or experts with deep knowledge of the subject at 
hand. Simply put, there is no substitute for embedded local knowledge giving a plausible 
theory about causality. The reason why, for instance, free primary medical care in a region of 
Ghana appears to have no effect on health outcomes - opaque to those engaged in carrying 
out the experiment - may be clear to the field worker whose familiarity with the social 
context permits them to give plausible interpretations of the results. This means that, contrary 
to the implied rejections of ‘subjective’ or narrative expert assessments present in much of 
the work on statistical human rights measurement,
107
 the reality is that if statistical 
measurement of human rights performance is to be attempted, then typically only experts 
with (subjectively generated) explanatory theories can offer plausible interpretations of the 
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results. What this also means is that apparently ‘judgement-proof’ methods such as human 
rights indicators and statistical measures, which might appear to allow objective measurement 
which bypasses the need for time-consuming and unreliable subjective expert judgement, in 
reality offer very little.  
 The second lesson is that there is a need for a renewed focus on individual human 
rights violations, rather than outcomes. There is a temptation to conclude that, since 
quantitative measurement of human rights performance is concrete and objective, the 
alternative is for human rights monitoring to simply descend into a morass of subjective and 
hence opaque and unreliable judgement-making based on narrative accounts.
108
 Yet there is 
no need for this to be the case: in fact, since purportedly “objective” quantitative 
measurement is itself so unreliable, a retreat from it may have the effect of making human 
rights monitoring more robust. As long ago as 1996 Chapman was making the observation 
that, given the difficulties of statistical measurement of economic and social rights 
performance, it was both more practical and more moral to concentrate on individual 
violations rather than to pursue the quixotic goal of monitoring “progressive realisation” (or 
what may be thought of as the modern ‘outcomes’ approach109). Despite twenty years having 
passed since the article was published, most of Chapman’s comments regarding measurement 
of development, as we have seen, remain true: it is “unrealistic and impossible to handle”110 
due to the difficulties and costs of analysing the available data. At that time the treaty bodies 
were still relying on physical records with almost no computerisation, of course, but as this 
article has sought to demonstrate, the problems run much deeper than a mere lack of 
computational speed - and Chapman’ conclusions remain trenchant.  
 The first of these conclusions was that since identification of violations was much 
more straightforward than assessing performance through the use of statistics, it was simply a 
more effective method for evaluation. Chapman herself eventually retreated from this 
position
111
 and, indeed, what came to be known as “the violations approach” ultimately 
resulted in a perpetuation of many of the problems identified in this article: a focus on 
statistical measures and a naïve understanding of causality. The Maastricht Guidelines, which 
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stemmed from the original article, assume, for instance, that it is possible to tell what 
“appropriate steps” are, and seek to make the failure to develop and apply human rights 
indicators a violation in and of itself.
112
 However, the original core argument - which is, in 
essence, that one should focus on what is possible to know, rather than what is impossible to 
know - is persuasive. Establishing, in particular, whether an individual’s rights have been 
violated in a specific instance is something which courts do as a matter of routine - violations 
can be defined and identified, if not simply, then in a fashion which is well practised and 
understood.
113
 The reader will of course be familiar with the manner in which courts, both 
international and domestic, achieve this. And, while they are not courts, the UN treaty bodies 
are able to perform a quasi-judicial function in assessing whether a violation has taken place, 
and currently, of course, do so through the (albeit under-resourced) individual 
communications procedures. Different treaty bodies have, for instance, found violations 
where a State failed to exercise due diligence in preventing a woman from being killed by her 
estranged husband
114
; where a State ordered its civil servants not to reply to written or oral 
communication in a minority language
115
; and where a State failed to prosecute a perpetrator 
of hate speech.
116
 And, similarly, NGOs, activists, academics and practitioners can engage 
relatively straightforwardly in identifying instances of what may amount to individual 
violations. To put the matter somewhat crassly, monitoring a State Party’s performance under 
the CEDAW vis-à-vis discriminatory violence cannot be done through simply counting the 
number of incidents and checking whether it is rising or falling, because changes in that 
statistic cannot be attributed to a set of policies, nor “appropriate measures” identified, due to 
the problems of causality already outlined. But if a woman is murdered by her estranged 
husband because the police fail to exercise due diligence, and if this is proved, then a breach 
of an international obligation has clearly taken place and a remedy must be provided. It is 
clear which of these techniques is more reliable and useful.  
 However, this focus on individual violations is not only to be recommended for its 
conceptual clarity. Chapman was also at pains to stake out a moral claim for its importance: 
as she put it, “the goal of any approach to human rights is to enhance the enjoyment of rights 
of individual subjects and to bring them some form of redress when the [sic] rights are 
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violated, not to abstractly assess the degree to which a government has improved its level of 
development on a range of statistical indicators”.117 In other words, human rights law is a 
“tangible” domain.118 It concerns individual people who find themselves at the whim of the 
oppressive state, and it attempts to provide them with a remedy when they suffer at its hands. 
In abstracting human rights to the realm of data and econometric technique - in subsuming 
individual human interests into aggregated statistical measures such as “the literacy rate” - 
the moral importance of the individual and his or her right to education, with all that it brings, 
becomes lost or ignored. And this, correspondingly, removes moral responsibility from the 
State: the language of outcomes is the language of management and of technical expertise 
(how best to improve measured performance); the language of violations is appropriately 
accusatory and shaming - a weapon.
119
 While there are compelling practical and theoretical 
reasons for avoiding econometric approaches to the monitoring of human rights, then, there 
are also important moral reasons which should not be ignored.  
 This also has resource implications that must be acknowledged. A consistent theme in 
this article has been availability of resources. On the one hand, academics are focusing more 
time, energy and financial resources on the development of statistical tools for measuring 
human rights performance. On the other, there is a lack of resources available for the treaty 
bodies to engage in quasi-judicial activities and in the kind of fact-finding necessary to 
identify violations. It may be suggested that what little resources are available, be they 
temporal or financial, could be more productively spent by improving the individual 
communications procedures and widening knowledge about them, and by improving the fact-
finding capacities of the treaty bodies when engaging in analysing State Reports, than by 
directing those rewards towards fruitless attempts at quantification. 
 Statistical measurement does have its uses in the field of human rights. It is, of course, 
important to use statistics to identify problems. For instance, it is undoubtedly useful to 
know, from a public policy perspective, that the labour rate amongst women in a given ethnic 
group is much lower than the national average, or that poor white boys perform worst in 
school.
120
 But there are extremely good practical and theoretical reasons for avoiding the use 
of statistics and statistical techniques in the assessment of human rights performance, or 
compliance with human rights treaty obligations. In summary, these reasons are as follows. 
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First, and most importantly, statistical measurement alone simply provides correlations, at 
best, and correlations do not amount to plausible demonstration of causality and hence do not 
permit analysis of the appropriateness or effectiveness of policy. This makes statistical 
measurement unsuitable, on its face, for establishing whether States are acting appropriately 
or effectively to protect the rights of individuals in their jurisdictions. Second, over-reliance 
on statistics is a boon for States Parties to human rights treaties, because it easily allows them 
to produce bogus ‘evidence’ of improved performance based on meretricious ‘objective’-
seeming data, which the treaty bodies have little time or inclination to critically analyse - and 
in turn to problematize evidence of compliance gaps. And third, blitheness about the 
complexities of human rights protection undoubtedly has a serious and large opportunity cost, 
as academics, practitioners and activists focus their attentions on the production of statistical 
measurements and econometric analyses, and correspondingly neglect other - possibly more 
effective - approaches. The monitoring of human rights has become increasingly quantitative, 
and all trends indicate that it is likely to become more so. Yet it would behove those engaged 
in the process to consider developments outside of the field and ask whether, in fact, that 
trend is leading towards a cul-de-sac from which economists and other social scientists have 
retreated.  
 
 
 
 
